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ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether Judge Conder committed reversible error in
granting hospital's motion for summary judgment one week before
trial when Hoopiainia failed to support his claim of medical
malpractice with expert testimony that hospital's actions caused
his alleged injuries.
Whether Judge Conder committed reversible error in
denying Hoopiiaina's motion to compel discovery of medical
records information pertaining to hospital patients not a party
to this action, when State law and hospital regulations require
that medical records information be kept confidential*

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following determinative statutes, rules and regulations are set forth in relevant part in the addendum:

Utah

Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. §§78-14-1, 3 and 5 (1953 as
amended); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e); Utah State Department of Health, Hospital and Psychiatric Hospital Rules and
Regulations, Medical Records Department, Chapter 7.404 (1984
Revision).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case.

This is a medical malpractice

action in which plaintiff-appellant Ben K. Hoopiiaina
("Hoopiiaina") seeks damages for injuries allegedly caused by an
unauthorized 200 mg. oral dosage of quinidine which he was given
while being treated at the LDS Hospital ("hospital")•
B.

Proceedings and Disposition Below.

On April 11,

1983, Hoopiiaina served a summons and complaint upon hospital,
alleging that during his hospitalization, in January of 1981, he
was given medication which had been ordered for another patient
and that this caused permanent and disabling injuries to his
lungs and cardiovascular system.

(R. at 5 ) .

Hoopiiaina served interrogatories upon the hospital,
asking for the name and address of the patient who was to have
received the quinidine that was mistakenly administered to him
and for the names and addresses of the physicians who were treating this patient.

Hospital refused to provide this information

on the grounds that it was required by state law and professional
regulations to protect the privacy of the unidentified patient
("patient X" ) and that disclosure of the requested information
would violate this responsiblity.
moved to compel discovery.

(R. at 55, 129). Hoopiiaina

Judge Conder found that the hospital

had a duty to protect the confidentiality of medical records
-3-

information pertaining to patient X and that disclosure of such
information was not provided for by the Utah Code or Utah
Hospital Rules and Regulations.
motion to compel was denied,

Consequently, Hoopiiaina's

(R. at 139).

On February 8, 1984, hospital moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff was unable to establish his
claims through expert medical testimony.

Hospital admitted that

Hoopiiaina was mistakenly given a 200 mg. tablet of quinidine
ordered for another patient in the same room but introduced
expert medical testimony that the medication caused Hoopiiania no
harm, (R; at 111-116).

Hoopiiaina failed to submit competent

contradictory testimony, admitted he did not have an expert and
asserted he would have one before trial.

Relying on this asser-

tion, Judge Conder denied hospital's motion for summary judgment
without prejudice.

(R. at 159).

On March 5, 1984, hospital filed a certification of
readiness for trial.

Hoopiiaina did not object and the case was

given a first place trial setting for September 24, 1984.
Hoopiiaina made no objection to this trial setting.

(R. at 137,

141, 159).
Hospital renewed its motion for summary judgment on
July 30, 1984.

Hoopiiaina again failed to submit expert testi-

mony that the unauthorized medication caused harm.
-4-

Judge Conder

admonished Hoopiiaina's counsel that he could not go to trial
without expert testimony of causation.
was still trying to obtain an expert.

Counsel explained that he
(R.

at 147, 159).

At a September 17, 1984, conference, one week before
trial, Hoopiiaina still had no expert.

Hoopiiaina's counsel said

that he knew a doctor and "hoped he would testify as to causation."

At this time Judge Conder granted hospital's motion for

summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure
to show causation of injuries through competent medical testimony.

(R. at 159, 160).
C. Statement of Facts .

hospital on January 5, 1981.

Hoopiiaina was admitted to the

At the time of admission,

Hoopiiaina had a long history of chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease and congestive heart failure. (R. at 116).
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 9, 1981, Wilda
K.

Cruz, R. N., a hospital employee, mistakenly gave Hoopiiaina

a 200 mg. tablet of quinidine ordered for another patient in the
same room.

No further dosages of quinidine were administered to

Hoopiiaina during his stay in the hospital.

(R.

at 111-112).

Hoopiiaina was released from the hospital on January
12, 1981.

On April 11, 1983, he commenced this action, alleging

that his respiratory and coronary problems were caused by the
quinidine tablet and other unidentified medication given during
his hospitalization.

(R.,

at 5 ) .
-5-

To fully investigate these allegations, hospital
retained Dr. Michael Allan Peat, Associate Director of the
University of Utah's Center for Human Toxicology,

Dr. Peat, a

biochemical pharmacologist and forensic toxicologist, carefully
reviewed Hoopiiaina's medical records, his deposition taken on
November 30, 1983, and the Affidavit of Wilda K. Cruz, R.N.

(R.

at 115) .
Dr. Peat concluded that the 200 mg. tablet caused no
harm and that Hoopiiaina suffered from chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease and congestive heart failure prior to his
admission to the hospital on January 5, 1981.

Dr. Peat's

testimony, is that "the single 200 mg. oral dosage of quinidine
given to Mr. Hoopiiaina did not cause any of the injuries of
which Mr. Hoopiiaina complains.

(R. at 116) (Emphasis added).

Hoopiiaina introduced no medical testimony to rebut Dr.
Peat's findings or to establish that his alleged injuries were
caused by hospital's actions.

Instead, he countered with his own

affidavit that he "was advised by the medical staff that he was
given the medication quinidine, which should have been given to
the patient in the same room.
medication."

Also the blood thinner was a wrong

(R. at 119). His affidavit also stated that he had

no knowledge of the amount of quinidine given but that he
"developed all of the symptoms that are associated with the over-6-

dose of quinidine as reported by the pharmaceutical company in
the Physician's Desk Reference Book" (R. at 119). This was the
only evidence offered in opposition to hospital's multiple
motions for summary judgment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In medical malpractice actions plaintiff's are required
to introduce expert testimony to establish that the defendant's
actions caused the injuries complained of.

Whether Hoopiiaina

relies upon negligence, lack of informed consent or battery as
his theory of recovery, he has the burden of obtaining expert
medical testimony that the unauthorized administration of
medication caused harm.
Hospital introduced expert medical testimony that
Hoopiiaina was suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease and congestive heart failure prior to his admission to
the hospital and that the administration of a 200 mg. dosage of
quinidine caused no harm.

Hoopiiaina introduced no expert

testimony that was contrary.

There is no dispute as to the

amount of unauthorized drugs administered because Hoopiiaina
submitted no evidence to rebut Nurse Cruz's testimony that only a
single 200 mg. tablet of quinidine was given.

-7-

Hospital is under a legal and professional obligation
to keep medical records information confidential and to protect
the privacy of its patients.

Judge Conder acted appropriately in

denying Hoopiiaina's motion to compel disclosure of medical
records information of a patient not a party to this action.
Summary judgment is the time for parties to establish
that they can prove their case at trial.

By failing to introduce

expert testimony that the unauthorized administration of
quinidine was the cause of Hoopiiaina's chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease and congestive heart failure, Hoopiiaina
subjected his claim to summary dismissal.

Judge Conder was

correct in ruling, as a matter of lawf that there were no
material issues in dispute as to whether Hoopiiaina's injuries
were caused by Hospital's actions.

ARGUMENT
I.

SINCE HOOPIIAINA FAILED TO SET FORTH SPECIFIC FACTS
SHOWING GENUINE ISSUES FOR TRIAL, JUDGE CONDER
APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED HIS COMPLAINT.
Because Hoopiiana failed to submit competent evidence

that the hospital's actions caused him harm or that he was given
unauthorized medication in addition to a 200 mg. tablet of
quinidine, there were no genuine issues for trial and Judge
Conder appropriately dismissed his complaint.
-8-

Rule 56(e) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment when
the party resisting a motion for summary judgment relies upon
"the mere allegations or denials of his pleading" to oppose
competent evidence submitted by the moving party.

The Rule

provides that
When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him,
U.R.C.P. 56(e).
On three occasions, hospital supported its motion for
summary judgment with competent evidence that the only
unauthorized medication given was a 200 mg, tablet of guinidine,
which caused no harm.
On each occasion, Hoopiiaina responded only with his
own affidavit reiterating the bare, unsupported allegations set
forth in his pleading, and failing to show that there were any
genuine issues for trial.

The record below is therefore devoid

of any competent evidence in support of Hoopiiaina1s claims, and
summary judgment was appropriate.

-9-

A.

Judge Conder Acted Appropriately in Dismissing
Hoopiiania's Complaint For Failure to Provide
Expert Testimony in Support of His Claim that the
Hospital's Actions Caused Him Harm.

At summary judgment, Hoopiiaina was required to
introduce expert testimony to raise a genuine issue as to whether
the hospital's actions cause him harm.
This Court has consistently held that a plaintiff, in
medical malpractice actions, must introduce expert testimony to
establish (1) the standard of care, (2) defendant's failure to
comply with that standard and (3) that defendant's action caused
the injuries alleged.

The purpose of this requirement is to

assist the trier of fact in deciding medical/legal issues which
are outside the experience and understanding of the average
citizen.

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980).
Hospital admits giving Hoopiiaina an unauthorized

dosage of quinidine but denies that this caused him any harm.
Hoopiiaina has the burden of obtaining expert medical testimony
that harm resulted.

Id. at 352; Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d

233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957)? Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262,
139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943) .
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a jury
decision for the plaintiff because the plaintiff submitted no
expert testimony that defendant's omissions were the proximate

-10-

cause of the injuries complained of.

The court held that evi-

dence of the defendant's negligent conduct alone was insufficient
and that it was necessary for the plaintiff to introduce expert
medical testimony that what the defendant did or failed to do
"caused the end result".

Id. at 220.

The court declared that

In the absence of such expert testimony there
is nothing upon which a jury can base its
finding on the proximate cause of the injury.
A jury may not conjecture or speculate, but
must have substantial evidence upon which to
base a verdict.
Id.
At the time of summary judgment in this case, the only
competent evidence of causation before the court was Dr. Peat's
testimony that the tablet did not cause any of the injuries of
which Hoopiiaina complained.

There being no competent evidence

to the contrary, Judge Conder appropriately found that there were
no issues for trial and granted summary judgment in favor of the
hospital.
Hoopiiaina cites

Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 6 04

P. 2d 474 (Utah 1979) and argues that summary judgment should not
have been granted because hospital admits giving the unauthorized
medication.

That clearly is not the issue at hand.

Rather, the

issue upon which Judge Conder appropriately based his decision
was Hoopiiaina's failure to establish, by competent expert testi-

-11-

mony, that the administration of the unauthorized medication
caused the injuries alleged.

As argued above, Hoopiiaina, not

the hospital, has the burden of establishing causation through
expert testimony.

Moreover, in Farrow, this Court overturned the

district court decision because the plaintiff had produced expert
testimony as to both negligence and causation of injuries.

In

the case at hand, Judge Conder appropriately dismissed the
complaint because Hoopiiaina produced no expert testimony.
B.

Because Hospital Introduced Expert Testimony That
its Actions Did Not Cause "Any of the Injuries" of
Which Hoopiiaina Complained, No Dispute Over
Liability For Medical Expenses Exists.

Hoopiiaina argues that he was required to stay in the
hospital an additional three days, incurring expenses for
hospitalization and medication for which he should be reimbursed.
These claims remain nothing more than that—bare unsubstantiated
claims without a whisper of expert testimony in support.
Dr. Peat's uncontradicted testimony is that the
administration of a 200 mg. tablet of quinidine neither caused
nor aggravated Hoopiiainafs pre-existing chronic pulmonary and
corony disease.

Dr. Peat also specifically testified that the

medication "did not cause any of the injuries of which Mr.
Hoopiiania complains."

(R. at 114). Since Hoopiiaina failed to

establish causation of injuries, Judge Conder properly found that

-12-

there were no issues for trial regarding hospital's liability for
medical expenses.
C.

Because the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
Requires Hoopiiaina to Prove That Hospital's
Unauthorized Treatment Caused Him Harm, Dismissal
of his Unsupported Battery Claim, was Appropriate.

Hoopiiaina attempts to circumvent this Court's decisions requiring expert testimony on the issue of causation by
characterizing a portion of his action as one sounding in common
law battery.

Such attempts were contemplated by the Utah legis-

lature in enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A.
§78-14-1 et seq. ("Act").

The Act codified the elements of all

Malpractice claims and replaced the common law right to bring
battery claims arising out of health care.

The Act covers all

malpractice claims by broadly defining malpractice as
Any action against a health care provider,
whether in" contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon
alleged personal injuries relating to or
arising out of health care rendered or which
should have been rendered by the health care
provider.
Id. at

§78-14-3 (29) (emphasis added).

The Act also broadly

defines health care as:
Any act, or treatment performed or furnished,
or which should have been performed or
furnished, by any health care provider for,
to, or on behalf of a patient during the
patient's medical care, treatment or
confinement.
Id. at §78-14-3 (30) (emphasis added).
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These comprehensive definitions brought every conceivable personal injury claim which could arise out of a patient's
treatment in a health care facility under the provisions of the
Act*

Consequently, common law claims for assault and battery,

arising from health care treatment in the State of Utah, are
replaced by this statutory action of "failure to obtain informed
consent". JcU at §78-14-5.l
Since Hoopiiaina's battery claim arises from an act
performed during his confinement in the hospital, the Act
requires that he prove that the alleged battery caused injuries
i.e. that "the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was
the proximate cause of the personal injuries suffered by the
patient."

Id. at (l)(g).
As argued above, proof of causation in medical malprac-

tice actions, such as this, must be by expert testimony.
v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980).

Nixdorf

Judge Conder therefore

appropriately dismissed Hoopiiaina's battery claims for failure
to show causation of injuries through expert testimony, as
required by the Act.

To hold otherwise would permit plaintiffs

1

The title of the Act sets forth the legislature's intent
to provide "for a codification of the elements of a malpractice
action based upon failure to obtain informed consent." Annot.
U.C.A. §78-14-1.
-14-

to circumvent and frustrate the legislature's intent—to codify
all related health care actions—by merely classifying their
claims as sounding in battery.
D.

Because Hoopiiaina Introduced No Evidence That He
Was Given Unauthorized Medication,, in Addition to a
200 mg. Tablet of Ouinidine, There Is No Dispute As
to The Amount of Unauthorized Medication
Administered,

Hoopiiaina argues that the amount of unauthorized
medication given is in dispute and claims his counter affidavit
rebuts Nurse Cruz's testimony about a single 200 mg. tablet.
Hoopiiaina's affidavit, however, states that he does not know how
much quinidine he was given.

(R. at 119). Judge Conder

appropriately found no disputed facts as to the amount of
unauthorized medication given.
In addition, Hoopiiaina's affidavit speculates he was
given an unauthorized dosage or dosages of blood thinner.

At

summary judgment, he submitted no evidence to support this
speculation or to show that if unauthorized blood thinner was
given that it caused harm.

To the contrary, Hoopiiaina's

affidavit declares that his injuries are associated with the
administration of quinidine not blood thinner.

(R. at 119).

Even if Hoopiianina's affidavit was competent, which it is not,
Judge Conder correctly found that it raises no issues for trial
as to the amount of medication given or whether it caused harm.
-15-

II.

JUDGE CONDER ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN PROTECTING THE
PRIVACY OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS BY DENYING HOOPIIAINA1S
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF MEDICAL RECORD
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO A PATIENT NOT A PARTY TO THIS
ACTION.
Hoopiiaina's interrogatories nos. 20 and 21 requested

that the hospital divulge the name and address of the patient for
whom the quinidine he received had been ordered ("patient X " ) .
Hoopiiaina also asked for disclosure of the name and address of
the physician treating patient X.

(R. at 55).

Because neither patient X nor his/her physician are a
party to this action the hospital is legally obligated to keep
this information confidential.

Hospital Rules and Regulations

for the State of Utah require that the identity of patient X and
information contained in his/her medical record be safeguarded
and released only to authorized persons.

These rules require

that
E.

All records shall be kept confidential.

F.

Only authorized personnel shall have
access to the records.

Go The patient or his legal representative
must give written consent to release medical
information to unauthorized persons.
Utah State Department of Health, Hospital and Psychiatric
Hospital Rules and Regulationsr Medical Records Department,
Chapter 7.404 (1984 Revision).

-16-

Provisions of the Utah Code support the State
Department of Health's requirement of confidentiality.

Under the

Code, a patient's notarized written authorization is required
before medical records can be copied or inspected by his or her
own attorney.

U.C.A. $78-25-25 (1953 as amended).

See also

U.C.A. §§26-25-1 et seq. which requires that all information
concerning the treatment of hospital patients be held in strict
confidence by

the State Department of Health.

Standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals ("JCAH")* the national governing and administrative
body responsible for the accreditation of hospitals, also forbid
the unauthorized release of patient information.

JCAH standards

state that
The medical record is the property of the
hospital and is maintained for the benefit of
the patient, the medical staff, and the hospital. It is the hospital's responsibility
to safeguard both the record and its informational content against loss, defacement, and
tampering, and from use by unauthorized
individuals Particular emphasis should be
given to protection from damage by fire or
water.
Written consent of the patient or his
legally qualified representative is required
for release of medical information to persons
not otherwise authorized to receive this
information. . . .
JCAH, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, Medical
Records Services, p. 88 (1983).

-17-

The laws and regulations of this state do not permit
the hospital to disclose the name and address of patient X and of
his/her physician.
prohibited.

To the contrary, such disclosure is expressly

In a case similar to the present one, the Arizona

Supreme Court reached the same conclusion.

That court vacated an

order requiring a defendant/physician to disclose the names and
addresses of former patients who were not parties to the
malpractice lawsuit in which he was involved.
Superior Court, 650 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1982).

Ziegler v.

The court's ruling

was based upon a statutory patient/physician privilege, requiring
that medical information be kept confidential.
Even though the names and addresses of the physician's
former patients might have provided useful information to the
plaintiff, the court denied discovery.

It was found that

The challenged order of the respondent court
undermines the privilege by having the
respondent doctors disclose the indentity of
the patients they had treated. Disclosure of
such information even to the trial court is
nevertheless disclosure which is not authorized. The former patients are entitled to be
left to their privacy secure in the belief
that their confidences, treatment, and
"
records are protected from disclosure.
Id. at 182.

See General Motors v. NIOSH, 459 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.
Ohio 1978) (a patient's medical records should not be disclosed
to federal investigative agency).
Compelling the hospital to divulge the identities of
patient X and of his/her physician would violate confidentiality
requirements imposed by the Utah legislaturef the State
Department of Health and JCAH standards and would breach patient
X f s expectation of privacy.

Such disclosure would also subject

the hospital and its staff to possible civil liability to patient
X for invasion of privacy and breach of contract.

Additionally,

the State Department of Health and JCAH might impose sanctions
for violation of confidentiality requirements.
Judge Condor therefore acted appropriately in finding
that the hospital had a duty to safeguard the privacy of patient
X and the confidentiality of his/her medical records.

This court

should uphold Judge Condor's order denying plaintiff's motion to
compel discovery of such information.

CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is the time for parties to establish
that they will be able to prove their case at trial.

On three

occasions Hoopiiaina was given the opportunity of showing,
through competent expert testimony, that hospital's actions
-19-

caused him harm.

No such evidence was ever submitted.

Consequently, Judge Conder's order dismissing this action, just
one week before trial, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1985,

Salt Lake City, Utah.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

Norman J.
Attorneys
Responde
Care, db
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

MAR 1 4 1984
Stay, GlerlySTfi Otf. Court ^

Charles W. Dahlquist, II
Norman J. Younker
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

eputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BEN Kc HOOPXIAINA,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
dba LDS HOSPITAL, and
JANE DOE,
Defendant.

Civil NOc C83-103
)

On March 2, 1984, Defendant's, LDS Hospital, Motion for
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's, Ben K. Hoopiiaina, Motion to
Compel were heard before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
the Plaintiff being present through his counsel of record, Matt
Biljanic and the Defendant being present through its counsel of
record, Norman J. Younker.
The Court having considered the Affidavits and
Memoranda of Points and Authorities submitted herein and the

n, MeConkto
Bushiwll
saonal Corporation j
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argument of counsel, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is premature.

The Court also finds that the

Plaintiff seeks to compel discovery of medical records and
information contained in the medical records of Patient X, an
individual who is not a party to this litigation and that
Defendant, LDS Hospital, is under a statutory, regulatory and
professional obligation to protect the confidentiality of such
medical records and information and to secure the privacy of its
patients and that the discovery of this information under the
circumstances of this case is not provided for by either the Utah
Code or the Utah Hospital Rules and Regulations which both
require that such medical records and the information contained
therein be kept confidential.

Based upon the foregoing it is

hereby ORDERED that Defendant's, LDS Hospital, Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's, Ben K.
Hoopiiaina, Motion to Compel discovery of Patient X's medical

Kirton, McConki*
& Buthnell
A Professional Corporation
330 S 300 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY
UTAH 84111

-2-

3
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records and information contained therein is denied,
DATED this / *-r

day of March, 1984.

BY THE COURT;

Dean E. Conder,
Third District Judge
'~
ATTEST
ROIXOWHtNOL

MAILING CERTIFICATE If

j X j 2 ^ ^ S l ^ ^ ^ ^
(/

Deputy C-n-vV

This is to certify that I hand-delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER on this the / P " d a y of
March, 1984 to the following?
Matt Biljanic
Attorneys for Plaintiff
7355 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah
84047

lirton, McConkie
& Buehn«ll
Professional Corporation
330 S 300 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY
UTAH 84111
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Health Care Malpractice Act,
U.C.A. §78-14-1
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act."
U.C.A. §78-14-3.
(1) "Health Care Provider" includes any person, partnership,
association, corporation or other facility or institution who
causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional
services as a hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed
practical nurse....
(25) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a
health care provider, under a contract, expressed or implied.
(28) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or
negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury
or damage to another.
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider"
means any action against a health care provider, whether in
contact, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise,
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out
of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the
health care provider.
(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or
furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient
during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement.
U.C.A. §78-14-5.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health
care provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care
provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be
done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care
provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain
an informed consent the patient must prove the following:
(c) The patient suffered personal injuries arising out of
the health care rendered; and. . .
(g) The unauthorized part of the health care rendered was
the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient.

5

O.C.A. §78-25-25
Whenever an attorney at law duly licensed to practice in the
State of Utah is authorized to represent the interest of a
patient of any physician, surgeon, dentist, osteopathic
physician, registered nurse, psychologist, chiropractor, or a
licensed hospital and that attorney desires to examine or to
obtain copies of any of the patient's records in the custody or
control of such person or hospital, those records shall be made
available, at the regular place of business of the person or
hospital having custody or control thereof, for inspection and
copying by the attorney if he presents to such person or hospital
a written authorization signed and acknowledged by the patient
before a notary public, or in the case of a minor, by a parent or
guardian, or in the case of a deceased patient, by the personal
representative or an heir. Such records shall remain in the
possession of the person or hospital having custody or control
thereof and the attorney shall pay, as part of the costs advanced
on behalf of his client, for all copies made at his request.

6

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e)
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, and adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
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Utah State Department of Health, Hospital and Psychiatric
Hospital Rules and Regulations, Medical Records Department
Chapter 7.404 (1984 Revision).
D.

Medical records are the property of the hospital and
shall not be removed from the hospital's control except
by court order or subpoena.

E.

All records shall be kept confidential.

F.

Only authorized personnel shall have access to the
records.

G.

The patient or his legal representative must give
written consent to release medical information to
unauthorizd persons.
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J.C.A.H. Accredidation Manual for Hospitals
Medical Records Services, p. 88 (1983)
The medical record is the property of the hospital and is
maintained for the benefit of the patient, the medical staff, and
the hospital. It is the hospital's responsibility to safeguard
both the record and its informational content against loss,
defacement, and tamperingf and from the use by unauthorized
individuals. Particular emphasis should be given to protection
from damage by fire or water.
Written consent of the patient or his legally qualified
representative is required for the release of medical information
to persons not otherwise authorized to receive this information.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I caused to be mailed four true
and correct copies of the foregoing, Brief of Respondent
Intermountain Health Care dba LDS Hospital, postage prepaid,
this

<*}

day of April, 1985, to:
Matt Biljanic
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Ben K. Hoopiiaina
7355 Sotfth 9th East
Midv^fe, Utah 84047

